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Abstract 
The model of portfolio management presented in Haavelmo (1969) is the point of departure 
for this thesis, presented in chapter 2.  This model introduces a fundamental link between 
asset markets and the real economy by allowing real capital to serve the role of both an asset 
and a factor of production. This link makes the model suitable for representing the fragility of 
the real economy to imbalances in asset markets. In particular, the model introduces the 
following paradox: Any attempt to control interest rates in order to achieve a monetary goal 
such as stabilization of CPI inflation may disrupt the equilibrium of asset markets, and in that 
way lead to changes in macroeconomic relationships that may be difficult to chart in real 
time. Thereby “predictability” of the macroeconomy, which is essential as an aid to policy 
decisions, may be lost.  
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1 Introduction 
How was it possible not to foresee the financial crisis of 2007, when there was a development 
in important economic indicators suspiciously similar to those witnessed prior to previous 
economic crises, see Reinhart and Rogoff (2008)? A model presented in Haavelmo (1969), 
also referred to as Haavelmo’s model in the forthcoming, is relevant for this question because 
it theoretically disputes the claim often made in textbook models and in much policy advice, 
namely that there is a relatively strong and well defined functional relationship between the 
interest rate as the monetary policy instrument and the macroeconomic outcome. Haavelmo’s 
theoretical model instead suggests that the functional relationship is far more complicated 
than one might first believe, and that this makes predictions much harder than proponents of 
straightforward causes and effects are willing to admit. In particular, Haavelmo seems to 
suggest that this is the price to be paid when interest rates are controlled in order to achieve 
narrow monetary policy targets.  
The model of portfolio management presented in Haavelmo (1969) is the point of departure 
for this thesis, presented in chapter 2.  This model introduces a fundamental link between 
asset markets and the real economy by allowing real capital to serve the role of both an asset 
and a factor of production. This link makes the model suitable for representing the fragility of 
the real economy to imbalances in asset markets. In particular, the model introduces the 
following paradox: Any attempt to control interest rates in order to achieve a monetary goal 
such as stabilization of CPI inflation may disrupt the equilibrium of asset markets, and in that 
way lead to changes in macroeconomic relationships that may be difficult to chart in real 
time. Thereby “predictability” of the macroeconomy, which is essential as an aid to policy 
decisions, may be lost.  
Although filled with insights, there is no doubt that Haavelmo’s model is full of 
simplifications, one of them being that the considerations are restricted to the closed 
economy. A natural extension is to include a foreign sector, which is done in chapter 3. This 
is done in order to make the model more relevant for applications, since real economies after 
all are open economies, large domestic markets withstanding.  Another motivation for this 
chapter is theoretical: We would like to know whether the logical property mentioned above 
(and which is due to certain over determination) “survives” in an open –economy version of 
the model. The answer, I find, is yes. The same logical property is also manifest in the open 
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economy model. Still, the model is based on simplifying, ceteris paribus, conditions and 
empirical counterparts to the theoretical conclusions cannot be expected to be clear cut in real 
life. A brief discussion of bridging from theory to data is given in chapter 4. 
The theory proposed by Haavelmo will be tested on US data, but before embarking on that, a 
presentation of monetary policy in the U.S. since the foundation of the Federal Reserve 
System will be given in chapter 5. As will be evident, interest rates have been either an 
important instrument to achieve monetary policy goals or a target in themselves. Accordingly, 
the U.S. is well suited for testing the implications of the theoretical model.  
In chapter 6, a presentation of descriptive statistics and econometrics tests is given. A striking 
pattern appears: Housing prices and private nonresidential investment are both affected, but 
not easily controlled, by changes in the federal funds effective rate.   
All estimations and productions of graphs in this thesis have been performed by use of 
OxMetrics 6 and PcGive13.  
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2 Imbalances in asset markets 
Our model-economy will consist of a private sector, including the government and private 
capital owners, a central bank, and a sector of producers. What distinguishes our model from 
those usually considered is that real capital is considered both as a factor of production and as 
an asset. In particular, the private sector is assumed to own real capital which it can rent out to 
producers. The presentation builds on Haavelmo (1969), Haavelmo (1987) and Bårdsen and 
Nymoen (2001), but hopefully the more detailed discussion of the behavior of producers and 
portfolio managers will be found useful for the extensions and use of the model in the sections 
that follow later in the thesis.  
2.1 The role of producers 
Suppose there are a large number of homogeneous producers taking all prices as given and 
producing one single good. For simplicity, we consider the case in which there are only two 
factors of production; real capital, symbolized by K, and labor, symbolized by N. The model 
is meant to be relevant for short-run analysis and therefore the supply of capital is assumed to 
be fixed at some level SK , which will also be demanded by producers.  Let Y symbolize the 
quantity of output. Then the production function for a representative producer can be written 
as:    
),( SKNfY =  
for which standard assumptions known from production theory apply.1 Let P be the price 
level and w the wage rate.2 Kr
 Further, let us define the real rate of return on real capital, , as: 
(2.1)     KS
SS
r
K
KNf
≡
∂
∂ ),(   
where SN denotes the supply of labor, which will also be fixed due to the time perspective of 
our model. The real rate of return is what producers have to pay for each unit of real capital 
they borrow from capital owners. Then, the profit-maximization problem facing the 
representative producer can be written as: 
                                                 
1 That is, positive, but declining marginal product of both factors of production. 
2 We assume that the price of real capital and the final good is the same.  
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KN
KNfYts
wNPKrPY
=
−−=π
 
of which the first-order condition is:  
(2.2)    
P
w
N
KNf S
=
∂
∂ ),( *  
This is a well-known optimality condition saying, slightly rewritten above, that the amount 
used of a factor should equate its marginal revenue to its marginal cost for resources to be 
used in their most efficient way. 
2.2 The portfolio allocation decision 
Let us start by introducing the following variables: 
M = money held by the private sector 
BL = net lending by banks, deducting all interest bearing deposits and bonds 
SPK = value of the stock of real capital 
W= total wealth 
Making use of these the following two balance sheets may be presented: 
Table 2.1: Balance sheet of the private sector 
Assets Liabilities 
SPK  
M                                                                               
BL  
Balance = W  
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Table 2.2: Balance sheet of the central bank 
Assets Liabilities 
BL                                                                              M 
Balance = 0 
 
Even though bonds are not explicitly represented on the above balance sheets, they are 
included when we define BL quite broadly. Therefore bonds, the stock of bonds, can be 
thought to be a negative term in BL . The same line of thought applies for deposits. Thus, the 
private sector has the choice between holding money, investing in real capital, making 
deposits in the Central Bank, and buying bonds. To carry out some of these investments 
borrowing from the Central Bank may be required, and if these loans are larger than the sum 
of the value of bonds and deposits, the private sectors will have created itself a liability, in 
which case BL  will be positive. The size of each component on the private sector’s balance 
sheet will, amongst other things, depend on the real rate of return on real capital, Kr , and the 
real lending rate on loans, r, referred to as the real interest rate from now on. 
From the above presentation the following question may appear: Since money yields no 
positive return, why would the private sector have incentives holding it, when a positive 
return from investments in real capital is available? The answer is: If money is not held, 
liquidity shocks could force the private sector to liquidate long-term investments, as 
investments in real capital usually are, of which the return would be negative.  
Suppose that the utility function of the private sector is given by: 
    




 Yrr
P
W
P
L
P
MKU KB ,,,:,,  
where real values of the assets and liabilities are included in order to account for money 
illusion. The private sector’s objective will be to choose the value of its assets and liabilities 
in such a way that utility is maximized, taking the variables appearing behind the colon in the 
above utility function as given. However, as is usual, the utility maximization will be 
constrained. First, there will be a budget constraint: 
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(2.3)    WLMPK B
S =−+   
where wealth W is assumed to be fixed due to the short time perspective in our model. 
Second, two more conditions will constrain maximization, namely two market-clearing 
conditions:  
(2.4)    BLM =  
(2.5)    WPK S =  
The first, that is (2.4), states that market clearing implies that the money stock is just as large 
as net lending. Thus for the money stock to increase net lending has to increase as well, which 
seems reasonable, as an increase in net lending implies that deposits are withdrawn or bonds 
sold, and hence the money stock held by the private sector increased. The latter, that is (2.5), 
explicitly states that the private sector is the only one having owner rights, and thus that its net 
wealth cannot be anything other than the market value of real capital.  
The above- stated maximization problem gives rise to the following demand functions for the 
private sector: 
(2.6)     




=∗ Yrr
P
WDK KK ,,,  
(2.7)     




=





∗
Yrr
P
WD
P
M
KM ,,,   
(2.8)     




=





∗
Yrr
P
WD
P
L
KL
B
B
,,,
 
Although the model is very generally formulated, it is possible to comment on the partial 
derivatives of the various demand functions. As wealth increases, which is an indication of 
the private sector getting richer, it would like to increase its assets and reduce its liabilities. If 
the real rate of return on real capital increases, i.e. if Kr  increases, investing in real capital is 
more profitable and thus *K  is likely to increase. What happens to the money stock (and thus 
lending) is uncertain. On one hand, a higher Kr  implies that holding money becomes more 
expensive as compared to the alternative, while on the other hand it implies that borrowing in 
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order to invest in real capital is more profitable. Which effect will dominate is not possible to 
say from a purely theoretical point of view. Next, if the real interest rate, r, increases, all the 
items on the private sector’s balance will be reduced as borrowing and thus investments in 
real capital will be made more expensive and saving more profitable. If the economic activity 
in the economy increases, captured by an increase in production Y, we will have the opposite 
effect of the one just mentioned; all the items on the private sector’s balance sheet will 
increase.  
Taking stock, the equations of our model are: 
(2.2)   
P
w
N
KNf S
=
∂
∂ ),( *  
(2.3)   WLMPK B
S =−+   
(2.4)   BLM =  
(2.5)   WPK s =  
(2.6)   




= Yrr
P
WDK KK ,,,
*      
(2.7)   




=




 Yrr
P
WD
P
M
KM ,,,
*
(2.8)   
  





=




 Yrr
P
WD
P
L
KL
B
B
,,,
*
                                                                                                                                                                                                               
In order to close the model, the following three equilibrium conditions, for the labor- real 
capital and money market, respectively, have to be included: 
(2.9)   SNN =*  
(2.10)   SKK =*  
(2.11)   
S
P
M
P
M





=





∗
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Hence, our model consists of 10 equations, but only 8 of them independent. Adding (2.4) and 
(2.5) gives (2.3). Further, either of the equations (2.6) – (2.8) follow from the other two and 
(2.3). Based on this I choose to leave out equations (2.5) and (2.7) in the following.  
Let us first have a look at the labor market. In this case we have two equations; (2.2) and 
(2.9), to solve for two variables; *N and w. Specifically, *N  is determined by (2.9) and w by 
(2.2), the latter because P is assumed to be exogenous.   
Next, let us have a look at the capital market. We are left with 6 equations. The number of 
equations may be reduced by inserting for W from the solution of (2.3) into all the others. 
Then our model of the capital market will be: 
(2.4)   B
s LM =  
(2.6)’   ( )YrrKDK KSK ,,,* =      
(2.7)’   ( )YrrKD
P
M
K
S
M ,,,
*
=





 
(2.10)   SKK =*  
(2.11)   
S
P
M
P
M





=





*
 
We are interested in classifying the variables in our model. Whether r is endogenous or 
exogenous will depend on how the monetary regime is specified, but the classification of the 
other variables will be independent of this. In particular, variables always exogenous are: P,Y,
Kr and 
sK , and those always endogenous are: B
S LandMMK ,, ** . Hence both SMandM *  
will be considered endogenous, which illustrates that the role of the central bank is to provide 
the economy with liquidity. As already indicated, the specification of the monetary regime 
will affect our model, but in what way?  
2.3 The effect of monetary regimes  
Suppose first that the interest rate is determined in the money market. In this case r will be 
endogenous and we will have 5 equations to determine 5 variables. In particular, *K will 
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follow from (2.10). Then, r will be the only endogenous variable in equation (2.6)’, which 
will give us the solution of r as a function of the exogenous variables. In particular, let this 
value of r be denoted by r . Expressed formally: 
(2.12)   ),,,(
−−−+
== YPKrhrr SK  
Inserting in (2.7)’, *M follows, which can be used in (2.11) to determine SM . Then, BL  will 
follow from (2.4). Hence, the value that the real lending rate takes on in this case, r , ensures 
that the asset market is in equilibrium. At this rate, the private sector will not prefer holding 
financial assets to real capital, and thus the law of indifference will hold in the asset market.  
It is important to comment on the signs of the partial derivatives of the h –function. As the 
real rate of return on real capital increases the private sector will have stronger incentives 
investing in real capital, and will thus be willing to pay a higher interest rate in order to obtain 
a loan, which may be required for an investment to be realized. If the supply of real capital 
increases the marginal product of real capital will be reduced, and we can see from equation 
(2.1) that the real rate of return on real capital will be reduced as well. Thus the private sector 
will no longer be willing to pay as large an interest rate as earlier in order to carry out an 
investment in real capital. Further, when the price level increases, the real interest rate will be 
reduced, being a well-established relationship. Finally, to see how Y affects the lending rate, 
an additional assumption is needed, namely that the marginal product of real capital is 
decreasing in Y.3
Next, suppose that the central bank sets the interest rate prevailing in the money market. In 
this case r will be exogenous and our model leaves us with 5 independent equations to 
determine 4 variables. Hence we have fewer endogenous variables than equations, and there is 
no guarantee that a unique value of each endogenous variable will be obtained. In particular, 
 Hence the effect of an increase in Y will be the opposite of that when the 
real rate of return to real capital increases; there will be a reduction in the real interest rate.  
*K  may be determined both in (2.6)’ and (2.10), and only by coincidence will the two values 
obtained fall together. Or, to put it another way, assuming that (2.10) holds, (2.6)’ will consist 
only of exogenous variables and hence there is no guarantee that the value on the left-hand 
                                                 
3 Such an assumption is plausible if we assume that labor and real capital are technical complements. Then, 
whenever Y increases, so would both the factors of production and hence the marginal product of real capital 
would be reduced, as technical complementarity implies that it will be decreasing both in own and the other 
factor. 
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side equals that on the right-hand-side. However, one way in which this can happen (or 
equivalently that the same solution of *K  is obtained both from (2.5)’ and (2.10)) is if the real 
rate of return takes a certain value, Kr . Specifically, the law of indifference will hold if:  
(2.13)    ),,,(
−−−+
== YPKrgrr sKK  
Hence the rate of return on real capital has to be of a certain size in order for the private sector 
to be indifferent between holding financial assets and real capital. But then, only by 
coincidence will this rate be equal to the marginal product of real capital. In other words, 
there is no guarantee that the real rate of return ensuring that the law of indifference holds in 
the asset market equals the marginal product of real capital. More specifically, one of the 
following three situations will occur: 
(a) KS
SS
r
K
KNf
〉
∂
∂ ),(  
 (b) KS
SS
r
K
KNf
=
∂
∂ ),(  
(c) KS
SS
r
K
KNf
〈
∂
∂ ),(
 
Haavelmo referred to case (b) as the classical case, which will hold in the regime where the 
interest rate is determined in the money market. However, once the interest rate serves as an 
instrument for the conduct of monetary policy, this condition can no longer be expected to 
represent a stable relationship. This is seen by the following thought experiment: Suppose that 
the interest rate is held constant (by the central bank) and that the stock of real capital (and 
thus wealth) increases as a result of investment activity. Then it is apparent from (2.1) that 
production Y will increase, from which increased economic activity and thus inflation will 
follow. Looking back at (2.13) we see that Kr will be affected by these changes. Only by 
coincidence will this change follow the development of the marginal product of real capital, 
which will be reduced since production has increased. Hence only sheer luck can ensure that 
the economy remains in the equilibrium situation characterized by (b). 
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In case (a) the real rate of return on real capital is less than its marginal product. Hence 
producers have to pay a lower price to rent one unit of real capital from the private sector, 
measured in units of the final good, than what they are able to produce. Then it is not 
surprising that their demand for real capital will increase and so will production and inflation. 
The increase in Y might result in the marginal product of real capital being reduced, which 
will have a stabilizing effect.  
In case (c) the marginal product of capital will be smaller than its real rate of return. 
Producers would then immediately want to get rid of the real capital they are already renting, 
which will not be possible since real capital only can be reduced through depreciation, and 
that gradually. The investment activity will be close to zero, and production will fall, from 
which an increase in the marginal product of real capital may occur, having a stabilizing 
effect. However, also the real rate of return on real capital will be affected by these changes, 
in particular, it is expected to increase, implying that this situation may be rather long-lasting.  
So, what is the main implication of the above analysis? The answer seems to be that if the 
goal of the monetary authority is to stabilize economic activity it should aspire to set the 
interest rate as close as possible to that ensuring that the law of indifference holds in the asset 
market. Otherwise there will be large and unpredictable movements in prices and/or quantities 
in this market, in particular, which will almost certainly lead to business cycles (“busts” and 
“booms”) also in the overall economy. One practical solution might be to say that asset prices 
must be of primary concern when the central bank sets the interest rate (if that regime is 
chosen).  
Taken at face value, this conclusion runs “against the grain” of modern thinking of monetary 
policy, flexible inflation targeting specifically. In that regime the nominal interest rate is fixed 
by the central bank, with the purpose of stabilizing the economy, and, at least until lately, the 
credo has been that the central bank should consider the dynamics of the overall price level 
(through monitoring CPI inflation), with no systematic regard to capital market prices.  
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3  Open economy 
Although filled with insights, there is no doubt that Haavelmo’s model is full of 
simplifications, one of them being that the considerations are restricted to the closed 
economy. A natural extension is then to include a foreign sector. This is done in order to 
make the model more relevant for applications, since real economies after all are open 
economies, large domestic markets withstanding.  Another motivation for this chapter is 
theoretical: We would like to know whether the logical property mentioned above (and which 
is due to a certain over determination) “survives” in an open economy - version of the model. 
3.1 The portfolio allocation decision including the 
market for foreign exchange 
Following Rødseth (2000), suppose that only two countries exist in our economy: Norway 
(domestic) and the USA (foreign). For the Norwegian economy we will make a distinction 
between the private sector, including private capital owners, and the government sector, 
including both the government and the central bank. For the US economy no such distinction 
will exist and we will simply refer to it as the “foreign sector”. Norwegian investors are 
assumed to have the opportunity to invest in both NOK and USD assets, but cannot hold 
USD. U.S. investors, on the other hand, are restricted to invest only in USD assets and hold 
USD.  
Table 3.1 gives a presentation of each sector’s assets, where we assume that the supply of real 
capital in both Norway and the U.S is given, respectively at levels SK and SK∗ , and refer to 
real capital in Norway (the USA)  as domestic (foreign) real capital. Notice that in the below 
presentation of balances USD is not included as an asset in itself. One might immediately 
think that this is a drawback of our model, but before concluding, let as have a closer look at 
the specifications and assumptions made earlier. Recall that domestic residents are assumed 
not to hold foreign money. Further, notice that for the foreign sector we do not operate with a 
distinction between the private sector, the sector demanding money, and the government 
sector, the sector supplying money. Hence inclusion of USD money in the balance of the 
foreign sector will not affect the sector’s net assets, and therefore such an inclusion is not 
made.   
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Table 3.1: Financial balances 
Asset Private sector Government sector Foreign sector Sum 
NOK M -M   0 0  
NOK bonds B -B 0 0 
Domestic real capital pK  gK  0 SK  
USD bonds pF  gF  ∗
F  0 
Foreign real capital ∗pK  0 ∗K  
SK∗  
 
Let E symbolize the exchange rate; the price per unit of USD measured in units of NOK, and 
P the price of domestic real capital. Then each sector’s net assets, denominated in the 
currency of the country in which the sector is resident, will be: 
 The private sector:   ∗∗++++ ppp KEPPKEFBM  
 The government sector:  gg PKBMEF +−−  
 The foreign sector:   ∗∗∗ + KPF  
Note that the following assumption is implicit: real capital is not mobile. Hence the market 
value of real capital in Norway is in domestic prices, even though the price of real capital in 
the U.S. may be higher. Thus we assume that purchasing power parity (PPP) does not hold. 
From the net assets we define the real wealth of each sector. Specifically, for the private and 
domestic sector, we get, respectively: 
(3.1)    pPp
p WK
P
EPK
P
M
P
EFB
=+++
+
∗
*
 
(3.2)      gg
g WK
P
BMEF
=+
−−
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Before turning to the foreign sector’s definition of real wealth, let us have a quick glance back 
at our model of the closed economy. Recall the definition (slightly rewritten) of the wealth of 
the private sector and the central bank, respectively: 
WLMPK B =−+  
BB WML =−  
where the private sector included both private capital owners and the government. In order to 
have the same definition of sectors for both model- economies, rewrite the private sector’s 
wealth as: 
WLMKKP Bgp =−++ )(  
Remember that both deposits and bonds were included in LB
BdepositsbondsLLB −=+−= )(
. Knowing that both are risk free 
and interest bearing we may consider them equivalent, and denote them by B. Also assume 
that there is no lending, L. From these assumptions we get 
 
If we make use of this and redefine the government sector to include  both the government 
and the central bank, in accordance with the open economy definition, real wealth of the 
private and the government sector when we consider a closed economy may be expressed as, 
respectively:  
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Comparing to the expressions for real wealth in the open economy, that is (3.1) and (3.2), 
respectively, it is clear that the difference lies in the opportunity to invest in USD assets, 
giving domestic residents the chance to increase their wealth. 
Returning to our model of the open economy, the real wealth of the foreign sector is given by: 
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Suppose that the period we are considering is so short that there is no room for wealth 
accumulation. If we denote initial values by the subscript 0, the absence of wealth 
accumulation for each sector may be expressed by: 
The private sector: 00000 ∗∗∗∗ ++++=++++ pppppp KEPPKEFBMKEPPKEFBM  
The government sector:  0000 gggg PKBMEFPKBMEF +−−=+−−  
The foreign sector:  00 ∗∗∗∗∗∗ +=+ KPFKPF  
Next, let us have a closer look at the market for foreign exchange, and start by introducing 
some new variables, following Rødseth (2000):4
 i = the NOK rate of interest  
 
 ∗i  = the USD rate of interest 
( ) E
dt
dEEee ==
 
, is the rate of depreciation 
where t denotes time.  
Whenever e is larger than 0 the NOK has depreciated, and thus more NOK have to be given 
in exchange for one USD. On the contrary, a value of e smaller than 0 indicates that the NOK 
has appreciated; fewer kroner have to be given in exchange for one USD.  
Recall that the private sector can invest both in USD and NOK bonds. The rate of return on 
investments in NOK bonds will be i, while for investments in USD bonds it may be different 
from ∗i , all depending on movements in the exchange rate. In particular, the rate of return on 
investments in USD bonds will be ( )Eei +∗
                                                 
4 The depreciation rate could also be specified as a function of both E and Z, e(E,Z), Z symbolizing shocks that 
might affect it. As such shocks will not affect the determination of the model let us simply leave them out.  
. To fully understand why, let us have a look at an 
example: Suppose that a domestic investor buys USD bonds on which the interest rate is 0    
(which is equivalent to buying USD).  Even though the interest rate is 0 there will be a 
16 
 
positive rate of return on this investment whenever the USD appreciates. In particular, 
suppose that E is 6 at the time the domestic investor buys USD bonds, but when he wants to 
sell them E has increased to 8. Thus, an investment of 6 NOK in USD bonds at t will give 8 
NOK at t+1, and thus rate of return on the USD bond will be (8-6)/6 = 1/3. Note that this is 
nothing else but the depreciation rate defined earlier, making it an essential part of the rate of 
return on investments in USD bonds. 
The private sector is assumed to always invest in those bonds giving the highest rate of return. 
As the size of this variable cannot be known with certainty, the private sector has to base its 
investment decision on the expected rate of return, which will be a function of the expected 
rate of depreciation, denoted by ( )Eee . Assuming that expectations are identical across 
investors, we will have perfect capital mobility between currencies. Then, the only way in 
which the market for foreign exchange will be in equilibrium is if the following condition 
holds:  
     ( )Eeii e+= ∗  
which says that, the expected rate of return by investing in bonds should be the same 
regardless of whether the investment is made in NOK or USD bonds. When this condition 
holds we will have uncovered interest rate parity, (UIP). “Uncovered” refers to the fact that 
the risk carried by investors, as their expectations of the depreciation rate may differ 
substantially from those realized, is not accounted for.  
With perfect capital mobility (disregarding risk, transaction costs and heterogeneous 
expectations amongst investors, to mention a few) USD and NOK bonds will be considered as 
equivalent. For there to exist no arbitrage opportunities their expected rate of return has to be 
the same, and thus separate demand functions for the private sector’s demand for USD and 
NOK bonds will not exist; rather we will have a condition for uncovered interest rate parity.  
Recall that the foreign sector is restricted to invest only in USD asset, which makes it 
plausible to assume that its demand for real capital is given by: 
),,( **
++
∗
−
∗
∗ = WrrK Kκ  
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where ∗r  is the real rate of interest in the foreign sector ( as bonds are risk free this will also 
be the real rate of return on USD bonds), and ∗Kr  the real rate of return on USD real capital. 
The signs below each of the right hand side variables in the above expression indicate the 
direction of the respective partial effects on the foreign sector’s demand for foreign real 
capital: A higher US real interest rate implies that buying USD bonds has become more 
attractive for US investors, and thus their demand for foreign real capital will be reduced. 
When the real rate of return on foreign real capital increases, we assume that investing in 
foreign real capital will be more attractive for US residents. Finally, the demand for foreign 
real capital is increasing in wealth, as US investors in this case have become richer and would 
like to increase the size of at least one (assuming that real capital is one of these), or even both 
their assets.  
When it comes to the private sector we need to recall that it can invest both in foreign and 
domestic real capital, and thus its demand for domestic real capital will be: 
),,,(
+−
∗
+
∗
+−
∗ = pKKp WrrrrkK  
where r is the real rate of interest ( as bonds are risk free this will also be real rate of return on 
bonds) in Norway, and Kr the real rate of return on domestic real capital. Again, the signs 
below each of the right hand side variables in the above expression indicate the direction of 
the partial effects on the demand for domestic real capital by the private sector: For the three 
variables r, rK and WP
As already mentioned, no separate demand functions apply for the private sector’s demand for 
USD and NOK bonds, but we will assume that it always invests a share of its wealth in bonds, 
in particular: 
, the same reason of thought applies as for the analysis performed for 
the foreign sector’s demand for foreign real capital. For the other two we reason as follows. 
The larger the real interest rate in the USA, the less attractive it is for domestic residents to 
invest in foreign real capital. Rather, it will be desirable to invest in USD bonds. Also, the 
larger the real rate of return on foreign real capital, the more attractive it is to invest in foreign 
real capital as compared to domestic real capital.  
P
EFB
P
EFB pp 00 +=
+
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Further, we introduce the following demand function for NOK: 
),(
+−
= Yim
P
M  
where Y denotes income. We assume that as the interest rate on NOK bonds increases it 
becomes less attractive to hold money, while as income increases it becomes more attractive 
to hold money. The reason for the latter is that as income increases so will the overall levels 
of transactions in the economy, at which point holding money will be profitable, since it is the 
most liquid asset. 
Combining these the private sector’s demand for foreign real capital may be expressed as: 
),,,,(),( *
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pKK
p
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Taking stock, the equations of our model are: 
(3.1)  0*0
000
∗++
++
= pp
p
p KP
EPK
P
MEFB
W  
(3.2)  0
000
g
g
g KP
MEFB
W +
−+−
=  
(3.3)  0
0
0
∗
∗
∗
∗ += KP
FW   
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(3.9)  eir π−=  
(3.10)  Sgp KKK =+
∗  
(3.11)  Sp KKK ∗
∗
∗
∗
∗ =+  
As can be seen from the above presentation our model includes 11 independent equations. 
Whether i, E and M are endogenous or exogenous will depend on the specification of the 
monetary - and exchange rate regime. The classification of other variables will however be 
independent of such specifications: 
Variables always exogenous: e
SS YPKKi π,,,,, ∗∗  and gK .  
Variables always endogenous: ∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗ randrKKKWWW ppgp ,,,,, *, .  
Predetermined variables: 00000000 ,,,,,,, ∗∗∗ KandFKFKKFBM ggoppp   
Let us substitute for gp WW ,  and  ∗W  in equations (3.6) - (3.8) and then insert the expressions 
obtained into equations (3.10) and (3.11).  By doing so, our model is reduced to 5 independent 
equations: 
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where, before specifying the monetary- and exchange rate regime, the endogenous variables 
are r and ∗r .  
3.2 Specifying the monetary - and exchange rate 
regimes 
As we are primarily concerned with how the determination of the interest rate affects capital 
markets, let us introduce the following simplification: assume that we are dealing with a 
floating exchange rate regime. Thus, in addition to r and ∗r  , E will also be endogenous (and 
thus so will ee ). Whether there will exist a solution to our model will depend on the 
specification of the monetary regime.  
Suppose first that both i and M are endogenous, hence the monetary authority leaves it up to 
the market to determine the price on money and simply serves as a supplier of liquidity in the 
economy. In this case we will have 5 independent equations to determine 5 endogenous 
variables: r, MEr ,,∗ and i. This indicates that a solution of our model will exist. Note that 
from equation (3.10)’, we will get an expression for E as a function of r and ∗r . Inserting for E 
in (3.4) and then for i in (3.5) will give us i and M as functions of r and ∗r , respectively. Then, 
inserting for i in (3.9) will give us r as a function of ∗r . Hence E, i, M and r will all be 
functions of ∗r . Inserting in (3.11)’ gives one equation in one endogenous variable, namely ∗r . 
This gives us a solution of ∗r  , from which the solutions of the four remaining endogenous 
variables follow. We end up in a situation where the amount of real capital supplied equals 
the amount demanded. Hence the law of indifference will hold in the asset market. No one 
will have incentives transferring funds from financial markets to the market for real capital, in 
either country.   
Next, suppose that i is the monetary policy instrument, hence it is exogenous. In this case we 
have 5 equations to determine 4 endogenous variables: r, ∗r ,E, and M. In this case E will be 
determined in equation (3.4), M in equation (3.5), and r in equation (3.9). Then we are left 
with two equations, that is (3.10)’ and (3.11)’ to determine one variable, ∗r . Suppose it is 
determined by (3.11)’, and thus that both domestic and foreign residents are willing to hold 
the amount of foreign real capital that ensures that the law of indifference holds in the foreign 
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market for assets. But then, only by coincidence will this real rate of interest give domestic 
investors incentives to hold the amount of real capital that will lead the law of indifference to 
hold for domestic real capital as well. In particular, one of the following three situations will 
occur: 
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In case (c), too little will be invested in domestic real capital. One reason why this may occur 
is because the rate of return on financial assets is high, relative to the return on domestic real 
capital. This case can be associated with large values of pFB, and M (which is most likely to 
happen for high values of r). The low demand for real capital implies that its real rate of return 
will be low, weakening incentives to invest in real capital. This reduction in investment will 
not only result in a reduction in the stock of real capital (through depreciation), but will also 
infect economic activity in general and eventually lead to a reduction in overall inflation.  
Hence this situation can be characterized as the bust of a boom - and bust cycle. Case (a), on 
the contrary, may be characterized as a boom. In this case portfolio managers’ demand for 
real capital will be so large that investment will be tremendous, and the price of real capital 
will increase. The increase in prices will give even stronger incentives to invest in real capital, 
and thus the original effect will be amplified. Case (b) will be the case in which, by 
coincidence, the same value of ∗r clears both the domestic and foreign asset markets, implying 
that the law of indifference holds in both. However, just as for the closed economy, this 
relationship will not be stable.   
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4 Some remarks on the empirical 
relevance and “testability” of the 
theory 
In the above chapters we have seen that certain logical problems may exist in portfolio 
models where real capital functions both as an asset and as means of earning profits (rents) 
from owning machines, buildings, and other productive equipment. The result we established 
was that the system became overdetermined in the mathematical sense if the short term 
interest rate was fixed exogenously by the central bank. Overdeterminedness can be translated 
to “not in equilibrium”- or “outside equilibrium” – situations, which we as economists 
associate with some degree of “chaos” with low predictability. We then have our paradox, 
namely that any attempt to use the interest rate as an instrument for controlling for example 
the nominal exchange rate, or inflation, or minimize business fluctuations, may lead to a loss 
of ability to forecast the macro economy.  
In the rest of this thesis, some hypotheses from Haavelmo's theory about the (dis)equilibrium-
constellations between asset markets and the real economy will be tested against data. 
“Testing” will in our case involve empirical evaluation in a rather broad sense. First, since the 
pure version of the model is so abstract and stylized, one cannot come about a rather broad 
interpretation and introduce auxiliary assumptions in order to make it operate. For example, 
agents probably do not have a precise and uniform assessment of the marginal return on real 
capital (the derivative of the macro production function). Thus, even if the disequilibrium 
situations above have empirical relevance, their effects will not be as clear cut as what is 
implied by the pure theoretical model.  
The model’s message is that asset markets and the real economy cannot be analyzed in 
isolation: Instead of regarding the determination of the activity level of the real economy as 
separate from the asset and loans market, Haavelmo's point seems to be that the real economy 
is deeply conditioned by the nature of equilibria or disequilibria in these markets. 
One hypothesis that emerges is that periods where the interest rate has been used as an 
instrument to achieve very tightly specified nominal targets, for example nominal exchange 
rate stability, may result in either a build-up to or even an outbreak of macroeconomic 
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imbalances. To test this implication systematically one would probably need to investigate 
long historical data series from many countries, but time constraints prevent me from 
following that approach here.  
Rather, I will inspect important individual cases in more detail to see if the "mechanism" of 
for example the great depression between WW-1 and WW-2, or the current credit and job 
crises, can be postdated by Haavelmo’s model. Although we will not go far in that direction, 
it is striking that when the recession started in the late 1920's it was made worse by the 
strictures of high interest rates that the authorities in many countries felt were necessary to 
retain scare gold reserves and avoid devaluation. In USA in particular, late in 1931, when the 
downturn in real activity had become visible on both sides of the Atlantic, the Federal 
Reserve raised interest rates sharply to show the country’s commitment to the gold standard, 
as we will come back to in chapter 5.  
It is not very controversial to claim that the above policy was one of the factors that turned a 
downturn into the Great Depression, but it also fits well with the predictions of Haavelmo's 
model. When the downturn came, and an already high discount rate was further increased, the 
real rate of return on physical capital no longer matched the returns that investors demanded. 
In our simple model-economy, this would result in a movement form a situation with high 
investment in real capital (and resulting jobs and income generation) to one where it is 
negligible, or even worse, dries up completely. According to the model such a situation is 
made worse by reduced inflation, which is exactly what happened.  
Finally, the model predicts that after the Depression became a reality, a lowering of the  
interest rate level that would have stimulated the economy early in the recession, would loose 
its force, and without external fiscal stimulus low activity in the economy would prevail for a 
long period of time. It is a widely held (but not universally agreed) view that low interest 
rates, made possible by massive market operations by the Federal Reserve (i.e. the central 
bank holding a large portion of government debt) together with the increase in real demand 
created by the war effort, fed the boom in stock prices. Once again, as predicted by 
Haavelmo’s model.  
The above suggest that Haavelmo's model is relevant for analyzing one of the really big 
events in modern economic history. Next we are interested in posing several hypotheses that 
can be tested econometrically on U.S. data since WWI. There are two reasons why this data 
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has been preferred to other. First, the U.S. economy has been without explicit regulations and 
controls during the period, so one premise for the relevance of the theory is in place. Second, 
the conduct of monetary policy has been subject to changes, providing us with data from 
different monetary policy regimes.  
According to Haavelmo’s model, targeting the interest rate may result in situations where 
changes in the real rate of return on real capital are not represented by changes in the interest 
rate and in that way may lead the economy into disequilibrium. Thus large fluctuations in 
important economic variables would be expected. The presence of large fluctuations can be 
investigated empirically in several ways. In this thesis, I rely mainly on two methods: 
Investigation of significant non-linear effects by estimation of non-linear functional forms, 
and detection of large outliers that signify sudden changes in for example housing prices that 
cannot be explained by the included explanatory variables. 
However, before turning to the empirical part of the thesis, which waits in chapter 6, the 
monetary regimes have to be identified. A historical overview of U.S monetary policy follows 
in chapter 5.  
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5 Monetary policy in the U.S. since the 
foundation of the Federal Reserve 
System5
The Federal Reserve System (Fed for short), the central bank of the United States, was 
founded by Congress in 1913 primarily as a reaction to the many financial panics that the 
country had experienced in the past, particularly the  severe crisis in 1907. The hope was that 
the Federal Reserve Banks, through extension of credit to commercial banks, could prevent 
bank runs or shortages of currency from evolving to financial panics and eventually a 
breakdown in the overall economy.  
 
THE GOLD STANDARD 
Gold was monetized by the Treasury through issuance of gold certificates to the Federal 
Reserve. This was a key element of the so called gold standard, which was in operation from 
1900 -1971.6
FINANCING WAR EFFORT 
 The main mechanism of the system was that whenever money supply increased, 
bringing about increases in inflation, it was evident that large amounts of gold had found their 
way to the US. This implied that gold had become less scarce, and accordingly its return 
decreased. In response, gold flowed out of the country, the Treasury’s money-making activity 
diminished, and the initial inflationary tendencies were reduced. However, how was it 
possible for the Federal Reserve System to serve its other purpose alongside the gold 
standard? For example, situations when credit provisions to domestic banks were required 
might very well occur at a point in time when the flow of gold into the country was modest.  
After World War I (WWI) broke out in 1914, European countries demand large volumes of 
goods for the war effort. Many turned to the U.S. to purchase these goods and gold flowed 
                                                 
5 The presentation in this section is based on those presented by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York at  
http://www.ny.frb.org/education/addpub/monpol/ , the Federal Reserve Education at 
http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/history/ and 
http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/about-the-fed/history/2006andbeyond.cfm , and the Federal Reserve 
Board’s publication “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions”, available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pf.htm 
6 However, as will be evident from the forthcoming presentation, during this period the country was, at least 
once, taken off the gold standard until a new parity was established.  
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into the country. The inflationary pressure of these inflows was evident, but the Fed took no 
actions in order to dampen them. However, as the U.S. itself entered WWI in 1917 and 
extended large loans to its allies, the flow of gold into the country almost disappeared, 
reversing the initial inflationary pressure.   
To finance the war effort, Treasury debt was issued on a large scale, and the Secretary of 
Treasury insisted that the Fed hold down interest rates while these issues were being sold. 
Initially these certificates of indebtedness were offered at rates substantially below market 
rates, presumably to ensure that the Federal Reserve ended up with the entire issue.7
OPEN MARKET OPERATIONS AS A COUNTERCYCLICAL TOOL 
 This 
arrangement was met with criticism, and shortly after certificates were sold at competitive 
rates. Still, the Federal Reserve had to intervene: To provide member banks with incentives to 
buy Treasury securities, the Federal Reserve stated that Treasury securities would be highly 
rated collateral when borrowing from the discount window. Effectively, it risked ending up 
with these issues as well. There was no doubt that a large expansion of Federal Reserve credit 
had occurred, and it now took the place of gold inflows as the major source of growth in 
money and credit.  
Also after the war, the discount rate was held low to make credit easily accessible for the 
Treasury and led gold to flow out of the country. As the country was still on the gold standard 
such a development was not welcomed, and the Treasury dropped its opposition to higher 
rates in 1920. Gold outflows were reversed, but the increased interest rates contributed to a 
dramatic decline in money and prices, and a short but severe economic contraction.  
In 1923 the Open Market Investment Committee (OMIC) was established, and during the 
recession one year later it began, with Treasury approval, to use open market operations as a 
countercyclical tool.8
                                                 
7 The advantages of Federal Reserve holdings of Treasury debt became evident in 1922. During this year the 
Treasury realized the inflationary pressure brought about by the large Federal Reserve Banks’ holdings, and 
suggested they be liquidated, to which the Federal Reserve agreed. Had private investors held Treasury debt, 
such an agreement would have been hard to reach.  
 By watching short term money market interest rates and the use of 
discount window lending, the OMIC decided on whether credit was tight or easy and made 
open market operations accordingly. This reminds a lot of the monetary regime today, but 
knowing that banks made heavy use of the discount window during the 1920s and that the 
8 Earlier most Federal Reserve officials viewed open market operations as a source of revenue rather than as a 
tool for implementing monetary policy.  
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country was on the gold standard, the differences are evident. In particular, it is reasonable to 
assume that open market purchases would lead to increased economic activity only if they 
were not offset by gold outflows. 
THE GREAT DEPRESSION 
Initially, the Fed used moral persuasion to discourage banks from borrowing funds from the 
discount window to invest in financial instruments and feed the speculative boom in stock 
prices. This had only limited success, and eventually it agreed to raise the discount rate in 
August 1929, after New York Fed Governor Harrison’s first suggestion in 1928 of a short-
lived but sharp increase (tempered by increases in open market purchases) had been rejected 
by the Board of Governors. This rejection reflects well one of the major challenges facing the 
Fed during the1920s: There was no consensus on the conduct of monetary policy. Some gave 
their support to a procyclical policy based on the demand for credit for commercial 
transactions (real bills), while others supported the countercyclical alternative: make credit 
easily accessible when the economy was in recession and put limits on it when the economy 
was growing rapidly.9
However, the increased discount rate came too late and included only limited use of open 
market purchases to soften the pressure of high rates. The stock market crashed on October 
1929 and on that very day the New York Fed bought five times the amount of Treasury 
securities ordinarily authorized by the OMIC for a week. Unfortunately, this measure was not 
enough, and the country encountered the worst economic downturn in history, later referred to 
as the Great Depression (1929-1933). 
   
The U.S. stock market crash was extremely bad news for the German economy, as it was 
practically built on loans from U.S. banks. As these loans came due, many German firms 
ended up in financial distress, and had no other choice than to liquidate their assets. Since 
Germany was the work horse of the European economy, the failure of German firms had 
effects across the entire continent, which experienced a great depression of its own. 
                                                 
9 The real bills doctrine is a theory of money creation that argues that issuing money in exchange for short term 
private credit is not inflationary. Accordingly, credit contractions only reflect that people no longer find any 
investment projects worth investing in, and thus creation of money will only lead to excess supply, and hence not 
be warranted. 
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Back in the U.S. there was a severe contraction in credit, but in accordance with the real bills 
doctrine the Open Market Policy Conference (OMPC) was initially reluctant to use open 
market purchases to stimulate economic activity.10
As Great Britain went off the gold standard massive gold outflows from the U.S. occurred, 
and in response the Fed decided to raise the discount rate. Specifically, the New York Fed 
raised its basic discount rate from 1 ½ to 3 ½ percentage points, an action that further strained 
an already weakened financial system. As discussed in chapter 4, this is exactly what 
Haavelmo’s model would predict to happen on asset markets in this case.  
 However, the Fed lowered the discount 
rate in several steps, but at a pace that lagged behind the effects of the contraction in money, 
credit and prices.  
In 1932 the OMPC gave in to pressure from Congress and the Hoover administration and 
bought a substantial amount of Treasury securities, which seemed to put the economy on the 
path to recovery. However, as the recent banking crisis had drained banks for currency, some 
of the extra money in circulation was used to increase excess reserves. The OMPC believed 
that this rise was due to shortages on lending opportunities for banks, and responded by 
making no more open market purchases after 1932.  
RESERVE REQUIRMENTS AND PEGGED INTEREST RATES  
In reaction to the Great Depression two important measures were taken. First, the Roosevelt 
administration took the country off the gold standard in April 1933, by which it allowed the 
price to rise in the market until it established a new parity of $35 an ounce in January 1934, 
up from $20.67. As a result gold flowed to the U.S., and was monetized by the Treasury via 
issuance of gold certificates to the Federal Reserve. Second, Congress passed two acts, the 
Banking Act (also known as the Glass-Steagall Act) of 1933 and the Banking Act of 1935.11
From these changes followed a rapid growth in money and reserves. In particular, banks built 
up large holdings of excess reserves, of which the inflationary tendencies were evident. The 
 
With these acts deposit insurance was introduced, and people again trusted banks with their 
funds. 
                                                 
10 The OMPC replaced the OMIC in 1930 and included transference of power from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York to the Board of Governors. 
11 Through the Banking Act of 1935 the OMPC was replaced by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC), 
which was given the sole right to buy and sell government debt, and was no longer a decision that each Federal 
Reserve Bank could make on its own.   
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Federal Reserve responded by increasing reserve requirement ratios dramatically, but banks 
continued their buildups of excess reserves, and contracted the money stock in the process. 
Economic activity contracted until 1938, at which point the Federal Reserve reduced reserve 
requirements.  
To help Treasury finance war effort during World War II the Fed pegged, in April 1942, the 
rate at which it would buy Treasury bills at 3/8 of 1 percentage point, a level that lasted until 
1947.12
Before we continue with our presentation let us have a closer look at figure 5.1. It plots the 
federal funds effective rate and CPI inflation (both explained in appendix A). Since stable 
inflation is (and has been) one of the primary goals of the Fed and the federal funds rate the 
variable it either targets or uses as an instrument to achieve this goal, such a figure is 
interesting to consider. In particular, it will be useful to combine with the presentation in the 
rest of the chapter, as it “illustrates” what is to be verbally concluded.  
 This rate was lower than the discount rate, and thus banks that held Treasury bills 
found it more profitable to sell these to the Federal Reserve Banks than to use the discount 
window to borrow when funds were needed.  As a result discount window borrowing became 
less important, and there was a large expansion in Federal Reserve credit.  
 
Figure 5.1: Plot of the federal funds effective rate and CPI inflation. 
 
 
                                                 
12 At which point the Treasury agreed to an upward adjustment of rates on shorter maturities in order to decrease 
inflationary pressure.  
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FREE RESERVES TARGETED 
In March 1951, the Federal Reserve was allowed to resume an active and independent 
monetary policy. Between 1953 and 1960, it pursued what came to be known as a “bills only” 
policy, generally confining open market operations to short-maturity Treasury securities.13
The FOMC was aware of the importance of interest rates in the economy, but did not want to 
establish interest rate targets in order to break with the strict pegging that occurred in the 
1940s. Specifically, during the 1950s and 1960s special emphasis was given to the behavior 
of bank credit (commercial banks’ loans and investments) as an intermediate policy guide. 
The Federal Reserve wanted to speed up (slow down) credit growth whenever economic 
activity showed weakness (strength). As bank credit behavior is nearly impossible to watch in 
the short run, it was not a suitable goal for the Federal Reserve’s day-to- day operations. The 
choice instead fell on free reserves, defined as excess reserves less reserves borrowed from 
the discount window. Open market sales (purchases) were made when forecasts suggested 
that free reserves were significantly above (below) their objective. 
  
During the mid-1960s banks started to borrow funds in the market, and thus the demand for 
federal funds increased. As a result the federal funds rate rose above the discount rate briefly 
in October 1964 and more persistently in 1965. Now banks could extend credit even when 
they did not have free reserves by borrowing funds from other banks. As a result free 
reserves’ ability to predict bank credit growth was reduced. Still it remained the primary 
target for implementing monetary policy throughout the decade.  
CONTROLLING MONETARY AGGREGATES: 1971-1982 
In the latter half of the 1960s rising inflation was recognized as a problem, and connections of 
free reserves and bank credit to the ultimate goals of economic expansion and price stability 
came to be questioned. The stage was set for a change in the conduct of monetary policy, and 
in the two decades to come emphasis was put on control of monetary aggregates. However, 
the way in which this control was performed differed from one decade to the next. 
  
                                                 
13 The “bills only” restrictions were abandoned by the FOMC in 1961 as interventions in markets for longer term 
maturities seemed necessary to stabilize economic activity.  
31 
 
FEDERAL FUNDS RATE TARGETED 
In August 1971 the Nixon administration suspended gold payments and in that manner 
effectively ended the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, making industrialized countries 
move to floating exchange rate regimes.14
During most of the 1970s, the FOMC selected objectives for growth of M1 over short time 
intervals, and targeted the funds rate accordingly. Hence the federal funds rate, as an indicator 
of money market conditions, became the primary guide for day-to-day open market 
operations, and free reserves took on a secondary role. The, earlier mentioned, increasingly 
active market for federal funds made the funds rate a feasible target, and bank credit received 
decreasing attention. Interest rates banks both paid and charged customers were affected by 
the federal funds rate, and thus so was the demand for money. If monetary aggregates were 
below (above) target growth rate during the intermeeting period the federal funds rate would 
be lowered (raised). 
 Now the Federal Reserve could tailor monetary 
policy to domestic economic activity, as it did not have to worry about fluctuations in the 
exchange rate.  
The FOMC was reluctant to change the funds rate by large amounts at any one time, even 
when this seemed to be necessary to achieve monetary goals.15
NONBORROWED RESERVES TARGETED  
 This was reflected by the 
development of the width of the intermeeting funds rate range. In the early 1970s, it was 
generally 5/8 of a percentage point to 1 ½ percentage points. By the latter part of the decade, 
the width had narrowed to about ½ to ¾ of a percentage point. 
Between 1970 and 1979 CPI inflation almost doubled, see figure 5.1, and inspired a change in 
the Federal Reserve’s priorities. In late 1979, through Chairman Volcker’s leadership, the 
quantity of reserves was targeted in order to achieve greater control of M1 and bring down 
inflation.16
                                                 
14 The Bretton Woods system, enacted in 1947, created a system of fixed exchange rates that allowed 
governments to sell their gold to the United States at the price of $35/ounce.  
 Because required reserves were predetermined, the operational objective for open 
15 However, during the two oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979, respectively, the Fed reduced its target for the 
funds rate substantially in order to boost inflation, which is also apparent from figure 5.1. 
16 Reserves refer to the sum of balances at the Federal Reserve and cash in the vaults of depository institutions 
that they use to meet reserve requirements.  
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market operations came to be a specific level of nonborrowed reserves, defined as total 
reserves less the quantity of discount window borrowing.  
The FOMC made sure, at any time, to provide just enough reserves to meet the nonborrowed 
reserves objective. Thus whenever inflationary (deflationary) tendencies occurred, reflected 
by money growth above (below) its objective, banks would have to increase (decrease) their 
borrowing in response to the excessive (deficient) demand for total reserves. As discount 
window borrowing was discouraged, the change in aggregate borrowing would affect the 
federal funds rate. A band of 4 to 5 percentage points wide was allowed for the federal funds 
rate, which was far beyond the width allowed when the federal funds rate was targeted.  
BORROWED RESERVES TARGETED  
By late 1982 the link between M1 and economic activity had been weakened, and M1-
targeting was suspended. In the day-to-day implementation of open market operations this 
change was reflected in the shift of focus from a nonborrowed-reserve target to a borrowed- 
reserve (funds borrowed from Federal Reserve Banks in order to maintain the reserve 
requirement) target. This targeting procedure (introduced in 1983) persisted, with 
modifications, through most of the 1980s and carried with it much smaller degree of variation 
in the federal funds rate than the policy of targeting nonborrowed reserves. 
The Fed made sure to supply fewer nonborrowed reserves than the estimated demand for total 
reserves, forcing depository institutions to borrow at the discount window in order to meet 
their remaining needs for reserves. The level of the federal funds rate was influenced by 
changing the shortfall of supply and thereby also affecting the extent to which depository 
institutions had to borrow at the discount window. When the Federal Reserve wanted to ease 
monetary policy, it would reduce the borrowed reserves target and supply more nonborrowed 
reserves to meet estimated demand. Then the pressure to borrow at the discount window 
would be weakened, and the need to borrow in the federal funds market decreased. In 
response, depository institutions would bid less aggressively for balances at the Fed, and the 
federal funds rate would fall. 
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BACK TO TARGETING THE FEDERAL FUNDS RATE: 1983 
Beginning in the mid- 1980s some depository institutions were struggling financially, and 
relied on discount window borrowing to manage their day-to-day operations. In such 
circumstances any amount borrowed from the discount window could be taken as a signal of 
financial weakness, and eventually lead to a run of depositors. Consequently, depository 
institutions were reluctant to borrow at the discount window. As a result the link between 
borrowed reserves and the federal funds rate was weakened: a high level of the federal funds 
rate could just as well be accompanied by low, as high, borrowed reserves. The Federal 
Reserve had to give up control over one of these variables in order to control the other, and 
moved in the direction of interest rate targeting.  
In October 1987, two months after Alan Greenspan took office as the Federal Reserve’s 
Chairman, the stock markets crashed, and in response interest rates were lowered rapidly, see 
figure 5.1. Throughout the 1990s the Federal Reserve more actively and openly geared 
monetary policy towards targeting real economic activity and inflation control. This may have 
been one of the reasons why this decade was marked by generally declining inflation (see 
figure 5.1) and the longest peacetime economic expansion in U.S. history. Also, by starting to 
announce its target for the federal funds rate in July, 1995, the FOMC made monetary policy 
more transparent, which probably had its contribution to the economic expansion.   
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, disrupted U.S. financial markets, to which the 
Federal Reserve responded by lowering interest rates and taking on the role of a lender of last 
resort for financial institutions. In 2003 discount window operations were changed as the 
discount rate was set above the federal funds rate, and rationing of loans to banks through 
interest rates was provided. The consequences of such actions are many and different, one of 
them being that depository institutions chose to borrow funds in the federal funds market 
rather than at the discount window. To what extent did they contribute to the forthcoming 
financial crisis? Answering this question will not be the objective of this thesis, but I could 
not help raising it.  
SLASHED FEDERAL FUNDS RATE TARGET 
As a result of the interest rate cuts during the early 2000s in order to help US financial 
institutions in distress, mortgage rates were low and the access to credit expanding. Hence 
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homeownership was made possible for more people, increasing the demand for houses and 
thus driving up house prices. There was clear evidence of a boom in the housing market, but, 
as history suggests, booms are followed by busts. Accordingly, during 2006, housing prices 
started to fall, which for some homeowners meant that their house was worth less than what 
they owed at their mortgages. Thus they were given incentives to default on their loans, and 
the number of delinquent mortgages (at least one payment past due) and mortgages in 
foreclosure started increasing, and eventually exploded.  
As mortgages had been securitized and traded on financial markets, the defaults on U.S. 
mortgages had effects far outside U.S. borders and led losses to spread across the globe. This 
situation reached a crisis point in 2007 when fears about the financial health of financial 
institutions led banks to contract credit provided to this group. As a result the rates on short-
term loans rose sharply relative to the overnight federal funds rate. Confidence in the financial 
sector collapsed and stock prices of financial institutions around the world plummeted. For 
banks this meant that loans were hard to sell, and therefore they tightened standards and 
demanded higher interest rates from potential borrowers. A classical credit crunch was 
realized. The Fed used all tools available in order to give a boost to economic activity. 
However, federal funds rate targeting was never abandoned, but the rate was brought down to 
nearly 0 by December 2008, the lowest level in 50 years. 
A GRAND SUMMARY 
The timeline presented in figure 5.2 gives a summary of the above presentation, from which 
the following pattern appears: Since the foundation of the Fed control of interest rates, 
sometimes more apparent than other, has been used as an instrument for the varying targets of 
monetary policy. In some periods, a low interest rate has been a target in itself. This is 
interesting because it makes it relevant to use US data to see whether there are any signs of 
very high investment activity, maybe together with sharp (and unsustainable) hikes in housing 
prices, after a prolonged period when the return on financial assets can be judged to have been 
low compared to the return on real capital. Hence, in accordance with our theoretical model, 
we would expect the occurrence of booms and busts in investment activity during this period 
to be partly explained by fluctuations, or lack of those, in interest rates. In chapter 6 this 
hypothesis is tested by considering the effect of the federal funds effective rate (FEDFUNDS) 
on the investment rate and housing prices, a choice of variables that will be explained therein.  
35 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Timeline of monetary policy targets 
 
Interest rates set in order to 
help Treasury finance war 
effort or to keep the price of 
gold fixed  
1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
The Federal Reserve 
System was founded 
Large changes in the federal funds rate 
needed to deal with double-digit inflation 
 
Federal funds rate targeted 
Growth in 
commercial banks’ 
loans and 
investments were 
targeted  
Monetary 
aggregates 
targeted with the 
federal funds rate 
as instrument Announcement of the target 
for the federal funds rate 
The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates 
made it impossible for the Federal Reserve to tailor 
monetary policy to domestic economic activity 
Discount rate set 
above the federal 
funds rate 
Open market operations primary tool 
for carrying out monetary policy 
Low and stable inflation is of concern 
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6 Descriptive statistics and 
econometrics tests 
The purpose of this chapter is to test whether there is something to the theoretical 
implications, namely that monetary policy implementation through interest rate control may 
lead to large and persistent fluctuations in investment and eventually in other important 
macroeconomic variables. The choice of variables is guided by theory, and represents 
variables that (in light of chap. 5) either have been targeted by the Federal Reserve or, more 
importantly, have been influenced by policy decisions. In the formal model in chapter 2, the 
assumption is that a profitability consideration related to the marginal return and productivity 
of real capital plays a significant role in the determination of the aggregate activity level, and 
our focus will be on this. Hence it is in line with theory to analyze business investments, 
which we do in section 6.4. However, in the U.S. case it seems relevant to consider the market 
for residential housing as well, for which the reason is given in section 6.3. First, an 
explanation of how the forthcoming econometric models have been selected is appropriate.  
6.1 Automatic model selection 
In the econometric modeling I have made use of Autometrics, which is a computer program 
for model selection that features in PcGive version 13. Autometrics makes general-to-specific-
modeling (GETS) less time consuming (not to say manageable) than what would have been 
the case if it was to be performed manually. The general idea of GETS- modeling is straight 
forward, the operational details of a computer algorithm is another matter, and Autometrics 
may seem like a “black box”. While a detailed exposition would take too much space, I have 
found it useful to include a brief exposition of what I see as the main characteristics of 
Autometrics. I stress that this is my interpretation and not a blue print of the technical 
documentation, see Doornik and Hendry (2009).  
Suppose that we are interested in modeling a variable y. First step is to specify an initial 
general model (in our case very simple) in which all the variables that are relevant in light of 
economic theory (or theories), and our knowledge of the subject in matter, are included. This 
model is called the general unrestricted model (GUM), and will in our example be: 
(6.1)  ttttttttt uyyyxxxxy ++++++++= −−−−−− 33221134231210 αααβββββ  
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It is desirable that both the GUM and the more specific models obtained through the later 
deletion of variables have satisfactory misspecification tests (SMT). However, Autometrics 
will start a simplification process even if there are some signs of misspecification. The logic is 
that the GUM represents “the best we can do” in terms of input, so we can go on to model y.    
The estimation results of a GUM may have either of the following characteristics, of which 
the latter is more likely. First, all the explanatory variables may prove to be individually 
statistically significant, in which case no deletion of variables is possible, and the GUM is 
itself the final model. Second, one or several explanatory variables might be individually (or 
collectively) statistically insignificant, and Autometrics will start its search for a simpler 
model.   
Suppose that in our case that estimation of equation (6.1) shows that both xt-3 and yt-3 
Even though Autometrics is an automatic model selection, it gives the modeler the 
opportunity to choose the level of significance, which is the probability of including an 
irrelevant variable in the final model. For example, choosing a level of significance of α % 
implies that one might risk that α % of those variables included in the final model actually fail 
to explain any variation in the dependent variable. Traditionally, GETS has been criticized for 
having a larger probability than the chosen 1- α of failing to include a relevant variable in the 
are 
individually statistically insignificant. Hence deletion of variables is appropriate, and the 
search for a more specific model can begin. An example of how Autometrics might perform 
such a search is illustrated in figure 6.1. The first step includes deletion of either of the two 
variables, or both. As indicated in figure 6.1, deletion of both will result in a model that does 
not have SMT, and Autometrics might choose not to count it as a terminal model. Separate 
deletion of either variable however results in two distinct terminal models with SMT. Now, 
how will the final model be chosen, knowing that Autometrics will end up with a unique final 
model? First Autometrics starts out by creating a union model of the terminal models, and 
thereafter there are three different possibilities. First, GETS performed on the union model 
itself may result in no more terminal models  than those unionized to create it, in which case 
either of them with the lowest Schwarz criterion will be chosen. Second, it may result in one 
new terminal model, which will be the final model. Third, it may result in several new 
terminal models, from which a union model will be created, and the three different 
possibilities just described will be present also in this case. Eventually, one final model will 
be selected.  
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final model. However, this criticism does not seem to apply for Autometrics, see Ericsson 
(2010).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: An example of how Autometrics works. 
Initial GUM that has SMT  
ttttttttt uyyyxxxxy ++++++++= −−−−−− 33221134231210 αααβββββ  
Deletion of yt-3 Deletion of yt-3 and xt-3 Deletion of xt-3 
The model obtained has SMT and no 
more variables are statistically 
insignificant. Hence this model is a 
terminal model (T1) and will be a 
candidate for the final model.   
The model obtained 
does not have SMT, one 
step back taken 
The model obtained has 
SMT. However, now xt-2 is 
individually statistically 
insignificant and thus deleted 
The model obtained has SMT and no 
more variables are statistically 
insignificant. Hence the model is a 
terminal model (T2) and will be a 
candidate for the final model.   
 
A union model created form T1 and T2  
The model obtained is the final 
model and has SMT 
No new terminal models 
found. Either of the two above 
with the lowest Schwarz 
Criterion (SC) is chosen.  
Several terminal models 
found, and once again a union 
model is created, which in this 
case results in one terminal 
model that has SMT 
The model obtained has SMT. 
However, now xt-2 is 
individually statistically 
insignificant and thus deleted 
One terminal model 
with SMT is obtained 
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The significance level puts the premise for the model reduction, which will not always lead to 
a unique terminal model. In some cases, Autometrics might end up with several terminal 
models even after applying the union model, as illustrated in figure 6.1. The final model will 
then be either of the terminal models with the lowest Schwarz Criterion (SC). Following 
Doornik and Hendry (2009), let T be the number of observations and k the number of 
regressors, then SC is given by: 
(6.1)     ,log~log 2
T
Tk+σ  
where 2~σ is the maximum likelihood estimate of 2σ : 
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As I hope has been evident from the above presentation, there is no doubt that Autometrics 
helps save time in general to specific modeling. However, its usefulness does not stop here. It 
can also be instructed to detect outliers in the final model, which can be done in two distinct 
ways. First, impulse dummies for each observation can be included in the GUM before 
searching for a simpler model, a process known as indicator saturation (IS). Second, impulse 
dummies can be included in the final model for those periods in which the residuals are so 
large that the randomness of errors is questioned. Notice that one of the differences between 
the two detection methods of outliers just described is the null hypothesis: in the first the null 
hypothesis is that they are present, whereas in the latter it is the opposite, namely that outliers 
are not present.  
6.2 Trends and breaks in the US federal funds 
effective rate 
As a background, I first investigate whether there are signs of and evidence for structural 
breaks in the federal funds effective rate (FEDFUNDS). If the federal funds rate has been a 
policy target in some periods, and an instrument in others, the periods where the changes 
occur ought to show up as structural breaks (which can be modeled by dummies) in a simple 
time series model of the FEDFUNDS. Moreover, in the periods where the interest rate is an 
instrument, any changes in policy priorities (e.g., price stabilization versus. financial stability 
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or exchange rate stabilization), may also show up in the econometric model. The relevance of 
this is twofold: First, it is of interest to see if the monetary policy interpretation in chapter 5 
can be confirmed by the break points found in an econometric model. Second, if there are 
significant breaks in the equation, these may represent periods where we also expect sharp 
changes in macro variables such as housing prices and investments, which both will be 
considered in later sections of this chapter.  
To check for such structural changes we start out with a GUM with FEDFUNDS as the 
dependent variable, and its 5 lags as regressors. Since no explanatory variables have been 
included, I instruct Autometrics to include an impulse dummy for each and every observation 
(IS), of which only some (as will be apparent in the following) will survive the automatic 
process of deletion of variables. Further, I have instructed Autometrics to keep the intercept in 
the final model, which is important for the interpretation of the steady-state as an estimate of 
the long-run equilibrium FEDFUNDS. Since this variable is likely to affect also the variables 
considered later, I set the significance level to 1%, in order to have a low probability for 
inclusion of irrelevant variables in the final model. Otherwise, a significance level of 5% will 
be chosen.  
Several of the impulse dummies are included in the final model, and in order to simplify 
matters I introduce a new variable, FEDFUNDSbreak, which will be equal to the estimated 
coefficients in the periods for which impulse dummies are included in the final equation, and 
0 otherwise. This variable gives the percentage change in the interest rate as a result of 
structural changes, one example being changes in the conduct of monetary policy. The 
estimation results are reported in table 6.1.A lagged variable is denoted by (t-1) after the 
variable name. This notation will also apply for all other tables that appear in the remainder of 
this thesis. Continuing what is already started, a twice lagged variable is denoted by (t-2) after 
the variable name, (t-3) behind a variable name denotes its third lag, and so forth.  
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Table 6.1: Structural breaks in the federal funds effective rate, FEDFUNDS 
 
Regressor Coefficient t-value
FEDFUNDS(t-1)    1.5556***   66.4
FEDFUNDS(t-2) -0.7264***  -20.5
FEDFUNDS(t-3)    0.1381***   6.15
Constant      0.1758***   4.39
FEDFUNDSbreak   1.0000***   41.7
Diagnostic tests
AR 1-5 test
ARCH 1-4 test
Normality test
Hetero test
Hetero X-test
RESET 23 test
Other
No. of observations
R²
 
F(8,209)  =   1.6326 
F(14,203) =   1.0221 
F(2,211)  =  0.65630 
218, [1955(4)-2010(2)]
0.992376
0.295298
Endogenous variable: FEDFUNDS
F(5,208)  =   2.0030
F(4,210)  =  0.40044
Chi^ 2(2)  =   3.6641
σˆ  
 
*p<0.05,**p<0.01,***p<0.001 
   
The results presented in table 6.1 show that three of the five lags in the interest rate are kept in 
the final model and that the FEDFUNDSbreak is highly significant (as can be seen from the 
rather high t-value). Below the coefficient estimates, I report several diagnostic tests for the 
final model. Appendix B gives an explanation of the different tests, but briefly: AR 1-5 tests 
for residual autocorrelation of order 1-5, ARCH 1-4 tests for autoregressive residual 
heteroscedasticity of order 1-4, Normality tests for not  normally distributed residuals, Hetero 
and Hetero –X both test for residual heteroscedasticity,  and the RESET23 tests for omitted 
variables and incorrect functional forms. The last lines of the table give the number of 
observations (and the sample period), together with the multiple correlation coefficient and 
the estimated residual standard error, σˆ . 
In table 6.1, and all other tables with estimation results, superscripts with *, **, and *** 
appear. These are related to the probability value of the relevant test, of which a short 
explanation follows. Apart from the normality test, almost ( the normality test excepted) all 
the test statistics reported are valid for tests in which a null of all zero coefficients is tested 
against the alternative that at least one is non-zero. Following Kennedy (2008), the p-value of 
a test will then give us the probability, under the null hypothesis, of the test statistic taking on 
a value that is in absolute value larger than the one observed. In other words, it will give us 
the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it is indeed true, committing a type I 
42 
 
error that is. Knowing that the chosen significance level of a test gives us the level at which 
the modeler accepts committing a type I error the relation to the p-value seems apparent: 
Whenever the p-value is smaller than the significance level, the null will be rejected.  
We note that the sum of the coefficients of the lags is less than 1. Hence , according to the 
estimation, there exists a stable long-run solution of the FEDFUNDS, which we can interpret 
as the long-run mean of the federal funds effective rate.17
Estimated long - run mean FEDFUNDS =
 Making use of the results in table 
6.1, and the assumption that the expected value of the variable FEDFUNDSbreak will be 0 in 
the long-run, the long–run mean FEDFUNDS is calculated to be: 
3761.5
)1381.07264.05556.1(1
1758.0
≈
+−−
 
In figure 6.2 we have included this variable along with the FEEDFUNDS and all the impulse 
dummies of which FEDFUNDSbreak is composed. It is interesting to see how the 
FEDFUNDS fluctuates along its estimated long-rung level. Notice especially that during the 
10-year period from 1990 to 2000 the FEDFUNDS level does not deviate as much from its 
estimated long-run mean level as during other periods of the same length, which is interesting 
as this period was marked by the longest peacetime expansion in the U.S. economy ever seen. 
Further, it would be interesting to see how the structural breaks in the FEDFUNDS relate to 
the conduct of monetary policy. With the presentation in chapter 5 in mind, recall that in the 
beginning of the 70s the US ended the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates and 
went on to target monetary aggregates with the federal funds rate as instrument. This change 
may have been followed by some of the breaks during the 70’s. However, some of the breaks 
almost surely are reflections of the increases in the price of oil (1973 and 1979), and the 
different measures taken by the government to tackle the oil price shocks.  
Note in particular, the numerically significant structural breaks in the early 1980s, which can 
certainly be matched to changes in the conduct of monetary policy. In 1979 Volcker became 
chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and responded to the two- 
digit inflation by sharp increases in the federal funds rate target, which was a huge change 
compared to the previous policy of targeting interest rates. 
                                                 
17 In principle, a 95% confidence interval for the sum of the autoregressive parameters could be found to include 
1; in that case the interest rate would be a so called unit root series. A formal test of unit roots is not considered 
here.  
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Figure 6.2: The FEDFUNDS, its long - run mean and structural breaks. 
Also, the effect of the recent financial crisis seems to have led to a structural break in the 
series, as the Fed attempted to boost economic activity by large reductions in the federal fund 
rate target, approaching the lower bound of 0.  
6.3 Housing prices and the interest rate 
The theoretical model presented in chapter 2 was probably invented to help understand the 
often large –and long-lasting fluctuations in private nonresidential fixed investment, i.e. 
investments in production factors. Such an analysis waits in section 6.4. First, as discussed in 
chapter 4, the model seems relevant for the understanding of the mechanism of the Great 
Depression, and then it would be interesting to see whether it can also explain the financial 
crisis of 2007. The consensus view is that this crisis was initiated by the burst of a housing 
bubble, and I therefore start with an analysis of housing prices.  
Two features seem to distinguish the US housing market from the European. First, the market 
for residential housing has been deregulated for the length of our sample period, satisfying the 
assumption in the initial model by Haavelmo. Second, investments in residential housing 
seem to be driven by the desire to make money as private households and construction 
companies are primarily concerned with the expected cash flow residential housing generates. 
In particular, the larger the expected cash flow compared to the interest paid on mortgages, 
the more profitable residential investment gets. Hence we may hypothesize that from low 
FEDFUNDS follow cheap mortgages, making residential housing affordable for more people. 
This may result in such an aggressive bidding for residential housing that housing prices rise 
so sharply that a bubble is created. However, this is only one side of the story. Housing prices 
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may also be positively affected by increases in the FEDFUNDS. If there is a speculative 
behavior in the housing market, an increased interest rate may lead to expectations of a rise in 
housing prices so large that it will outpace the increase in borrowing costs, once again, 
creating a bubble. These relationships between the FEDFUNDS and housing prices will be of 
primary concern herein, even though the mechanisms operating in the housing market are far 
more complicated.  
The variable considered will be the national housing price index (HPI), which I have 
constructed for the purpose of this thesis, as explained in Appendix A. What is of particular 
interest in our case is to see to what extent changes in the FEDFUNDS affect the cyclical 
component of a time series, in this specific case that of the house price index (HPI). Notice 
that we are considering fluctuations in the log of nominal housing prices, LHPI, which is 
convenient as it can be approximated to percentage changes in housing prices. 
 
Figure 6.3: Four alternative time series of LHPI as deviation from trend. 
However, it is important to notice that the cyclical component will strongly depend on how 
the trend component is measured, as illustrated in figure 6.3. In this thesis I will make use of 
four different trends. Three of them are deterministic; the linear, the square and the cubic 
trend. The fourth trend calculation is a time varying trend and is constructed by use of the 
Hodrick Prescott (hp) filter.18
As has already been stated in the introduction, we do expect the FEDFUNDS to affect 
housing prices, and a convenient starting point is to have a closer look at the cross correlation 
function between the log of housing prices, LHPI, and the FEDFUNDS. In general, this 
function graphs the correlation coefficients between a series x
  
t
                                                 
18 Confer Appendix B for an explanation of these trends.   
 and the lags of another series 
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yt xyicˆ. Let denote the sample cross-covariance, and 
xc0ˆ  and 
yc0ˆ the variances of the x series and 
the y series, respectively. Following Doornik (2009), the cross correlation function is then 
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using the full sample means x and y . 
In our case the x-variable will be LHPI and the y-variable the FEDFUNDS. The results are 
reported in figure 6.4. All 20 cross correlation coefficients seem to be significant, as they are 
all outside the “corridor” indicated by the two thicker lines in figure 6.2. Hence changes in the 
FEDFUNDS seem to have an effect on housing prices, although diminishing. Further, it 
appears as if the FEDFUNDS leads housing prices. 
 
Figure 6.4: Cross correlation function between FEDFUNDS and LHPI. 
However, we would expect the effect of the FEDFUNDS on housing prices to depend on the 
initial level of the FEDFUNDS, which is confirmed by figure 6.5. It is a scatter plot 
measuring LHPI along the vertical axis and the FEDFUNDS along the horizontal. 10 
regression lines are included, each with the same number of observations included, and are all 
results of a regression of LHPI on the FEDFUNDS by use of ordinary least squares (OLS). 
The constant shift of the trend lines to the right reflects the existence of a trend component of 
housing prices.  
The following pattern appears: If the FEDFUNDS is initially low, a marginal rise will result 
in significant reductions in housing prices. However, for higher initial FEDFUNDS, the effect 
of it increasing becomes less significant, and in a couple of cases it even changes sign. In 
particular, for high initial levels of the FEDFUNDS, there seems to be negligible effects on 
housing prices of changes in the FEDFUNDS.  
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Figure 6.5: Scatter plot of FEDFUNDS and LHPI with 10 sequential regression lines.  
We will primarily be interested in the effect of interest rate control (by the Fed) on housing 
prices and will thus focus on the nominal federal funds effective rate. However, let there be 
no doubt about the fact that investors will make decisions based on the real interest rate (as 
seen in the core model presented in chapter 2), but since rules such as the Taylor rule ensure 
that there is no contrast in the movement of the real and the nominal interest rate, I believe 
that the validity of the empirical results will not be endangered.  
Further, there are two more reasons why the nominal interest rate rather than the real interest 
rate has been included, both related to the measurement of the latter. First, the real interest 
rate depends on inflation expectations, of which observations are impossible and 
approximations beyond the scope of this thesis. Second, given that it was observable, 
expectations of what inflation should be included? The convention is to use consumer price 
inflation but this is very crude both theoretically and practically, as the relevant price increase 
may be specific to sector products, for example. In principle one should also account for 
capital depreciation and for tax rates when calculating the user cost of capital.  
These issues are important but would take us beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead we have 
modeled the empirical relationship between the nominal interest rates and investment and 
housing prices “heads on”. It is understood that what we then estimate are reduced form 
equations, but as such they can in some cases be interpreted as causal relationships because it 
is safe to assume that the nominal interest rate changes first and that the effects on real 
investment ( if any) comes after. 
Two final empirical models will be presented. The difference lies in how the trend component 
is incorporated in the GUM. The deterministic trends appear as regressors with LHPI as the 
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dependent variable, whereas the hp- trend will be subtracted from LHPI and the new 
endogenous variable LHPIhp created. As was apparent from figure 6.5, the effect on the 
investment rate of increases in the FEDFUNDS is highly affected by the initial level of the 
FEDFUNDS.  In order to represent this, the explanatory variables in our model will be the 
FEDFUNDS, the inverse of FEDFUNDS (INVFEDFUNDS), and the inverse of the squared 
of the FEDFUNDS (INVsqFEDFUNDS). Hence, the functional form is non-linear.  
In the initial GUMs, 8 lags of each variable have been included. In addition, for the hp trend, 
it is important to make explicit that that the constant has been fixed prior to allowing 
Autometrics to delete variables, in order to ensure that it is retained throughout the selection 
process and gives a final model with desirable long- run properties. After the final model has 
been estimated, it has been tested for significant outliers, also performed by Autometrics (by 
the method of large outliers). The two models, one for each trend, then obtained, are reported 
in table 6.2. Note that all the diagnostic tests at the bottom of the table are insignificant at the 
1 % and all but one at the 5 % level. This is important for doing valid tests of significance by 
use of the t- and F-statistics for example.  
The first thing that appears from table 6.2 is that Autometrics has found significant outliers in 
the final models, regardless of trend. Hence for these periods there have been changes in 
housing prices that cannot be explained by changes in the explanatory variables included in 
our model. More specifically, the fluctuations in housing prices at these points in time cannot 
be explained by fluctuations in their lags or the FEDFUNDS. For instance, the negative 
coefficients of the significant outlier found for the 3rd
In figure 6.5 and 6.6 the dynamic multipliers for the deterministic and the stochastic trends 
are illustrated, for three different initial levels of the FEDFUNDS. Because of the functional  
 quarter in 2008 suggest that there was a 
reduction in housing prices beyond those accounted for by changes in the FEDFUNDS. With 
reference to the theoretical discussion, such sharp changes in the price of a capital good may 
very well occur after a period when the price has been increasing as a result of widespread 
beliefs in the market about high returns on this type of investment. Initially, those beliefs may 
have been based on low loan interest rates and little or no response in the policy interest rates 
to the rise in house prices. In this way the fuel and mechanism of booms and busts may have 
been installed. Hence, for the outlier in our case there simply might have been a burst of a 
bubble that the Fed could not have prevented at that time in history.  
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Table 6.2: Estimation results for the models chosen by Autometrics, housing prices. 
Regressor Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant    0.1470***  5.90 -0.0013 -0.415
LHPI(t-1)     0.9824*** 21.0 - -
LHPI(t-3)   0.2337** 3.13 - -
LHPI(t-5)     -0.2698*** -6.31 - -
LHPIhp(t-1)   - -   0.8078***  17.9
LHPIhp(t-3)    - -   0.1821**  2.87
LHPIhp(t-5)    - -  -0.1711*** -3.69
FEDFUNDS(t-2)  - -    0.0011***   3.41
FEDFUNDS(t-4)  -0.0020** -3.31  -0.0008*  -2.10
FEDFUNDS(t-5)  0.0027*** 4.37 - -
INVFEDFUNDS(t-5) - -  -0.0522** -2.62
INVFEDFUNDS(t-6)  0.0269*** 5.46   0.0445***  3.97
INVsqFEDFUNDS(t-2) -0.0005*** -3.86  -0.0005*** -3.48
INVsqFEDFUNDS(t-5) - -  0.0205* 2.56
t  0.0006*** 4.45 - -
I: 1977(4)  0.0197**  2.95   0.0166**   3.09
I: 1979(1)  0.0220**  3.33   0.0227***   4.30
I: 1981(4) - -  -0.0302***  -5.17
I: 1982(3) -0.0282* -3.90  -0.0252***  -4.26
I: 1984(4) - -  -0.0149**  -2.81
I: 2008(3) -0.0194** -2.94  -0.0186***  -3.45
Diagnostic tests
AR 1-5 test
ARCH 1-4 test
Normality test
Hetero test
Hetero X-test
RESET 23 test
Other
No. of observations
R² 0.999819
0.00638454
F(17,109) =   1.4857 
F(53,73)  =   1.2801 
F(2,115)  = 0.085199 
F(16,112) =   1.7610*
F(44,84)  =   1.2303
F(2,118)  =  0.31313  
133 [1977(1)-2010(1)]
0.954233
0.00517259
133 [1977(1)-2010(1)]
Endogenous variable: LHPI Endogenous variable: LHPIhp 
F(5,112)  =  0.48597 
F(4,125)  =  0.78599 
Chi^ 2(2)  =  0.24654 
F(5,115)  =  0.43578 
F(4,125)  =  0.49633 
Chi^ 2(2)  =  0.27857 
σˆ  
    * p<0.05,**p< 0.01, ***p<0.001 
form, these are not available from PcGive, but have been calculated manually and I have used 
Excel to find the numerical values for the different multipliers. Notice that the multipliers 
reported are those of a temporary change in the FEDFUNDS.19
                                                 
19 The change in the FEDFUNDS is one of one percentage point (1 %) both in this case and in the case for 
nonresidential fixed investment (considered in the next section), and for both the temporary and permanent case. 
 Further, for all the figures in 
which dynamic multipliers are illustrated the number of quarters after the initial change is 
measured along the x-axis. Taken at face value, figure 6.6 implies that the market has been 
“speculative” all the time, which seems unlikely even for the US. Having a closer look at 
figure 6.3, the dynamic multipliers obtained from the determinist trend would have given a 
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similar picture, had the cubic trend been used, that is if t, t2 and t3 all had been included in the 
final model. However, they were not, which suggests that we should rely on the results 
obtained from the econometric model with the deterministic trend, and this is exactly what 
will be done in the rest of this section.   
As can be seen from figure 6.6, the effects of a temporary change in the FEDFUNDS are very 
small (in absolute value), at most about -0.5 percentage point, and that is for a low initial level 
of the FEDFUNDS, when the effect is expected to be the largest. However, when there is a 
permanent change in the FEDFUND, the effects might be substantial. For instance, for an 
initial value of the FEDFUNDS of 0.25 percentage points a permanent marginal increase 
could be approximated (by looking at the relevant graph of figure 6.6)  to be -5 percentage 
points 25 quarter after the increase. Hence, from the considerations of the dynamic multipliers 
we are lead to conclude that: Housing prices are affected, but not easily controlled, by 
changes in the FEDFUNDS. 
 
Figure 6.6: Temporary change in the FEDFUNDS, effect on LHPI, deterministic trend. 
 
Figure 6.7:  Temporary change in the FEDFUNDS, effect on LHPIhp, hp-trend.   
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From the estimation results in table 6.2, the high R2 indicates that we are able to explain close 
to all the fluctuations in the log of housing prices by fluctuation in their lags and the 
FEDFUNDS (for the deterministic trend also the trend component will serve as an 
explanatory variable). However, this may be misleading, which will be shown in the 
following. For the deterministic trend, introduce DLHPI as the dependent variables, that is, 
subtract the first lag of LHPI on both sides of the estimated equation. The model then 
obtained will be statistically equivalent to that reported in table 6.2, which is confirmed by the 
exact same value of the estimated residual standard error (not reported). We will only present 
the graph with the actual value of DLHPI against its fitted counterpart, appearing in figure 
6.8. From the figure we can see that our model seems to explain the really big booms and 
busts in housing prices, but not all the fluctuations, off course, as it is rather simplistic. Just 
for it to be mentioned, in this model the value of R2
 
 is 0.76.  
Figure 6.8: Actual value of DLHPI against its fitted counterpart.  
6.4 Private nonresidential fixed investment 
As for the residential investment, the crucial variable for private nonresidential investment 
will be the expected real rate of return. Whenever the FEDFUNDS is low, borrowing costs 
will be low. Then, two things might happen. With low borrowing costs, investment will be 
made possible for more people and thus their investment could increase. On the other hand, a 
lower FEDFUNDS may also be expected to lead to a decrease in the future price of real 
capital, making investment less attractive. Hence, we expect the FEDFUNDS to affect the 
investment, but are uncertain about the sign of the effect. 
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Further, it is important to note that the effect may be time dependent: When the FEDFUNDS 
is low at the same time as the real rate of return on productive capital is low, there may be 
little investment activity in spite of the low borrowing costs. This can be the case in a 
depression when there is idle capacity and many investors seek a safe haven rather than risk 
investing in production facilities that after all do depend on demand to repay even the lowest 
of borrowing costs. At the other extreme: Even a very high interest rate may not be enough to 
curb keen investors in a period of boom. Hence, even though there is a functional relationship 
between interest rates and investments, that function is probably not linear and can also shift 
over time, as indicated. For what its worth, this is the main implication of Haavelmo’s 
theorizing in his field. No doubt it is nihilistic, but at least it warns against over-
simplifications.   
To access the correct information on the investment activity, the level of investment has to be 
seen in light of the overall economic activity, as measured by the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Accordingly, the variable considered in this section will be the rate of private 
nonresidential fixed investment, that is, the size of private nonresidential fixed investment 
relative to the size of the GDP, and will be referred to as the investment rate.  
For housing prices we saw that there were significant correlation coefficients for the 20 first 
lags, but that they were diminishing (in absolute value that is). For the investment rate 
however, as is evident form figure 6.9, the cross correlation coefficients are not significant 
until after some 25 quarters, at which point they are positive. There may be many reasons for 
this, but one can certainly be closely related to the theoretical model presented in chapter 2. 
Knowing that the interest rate has been controlled by the Fed during our sample period, our 
theoretical model suggests that booms and busts are likely to occur. Figure 6.9 seems to 
support this as the investment rate today appears to be affected by the FEDFUNDS almost 
eight and a half years back, which sets it of on a boom that seems not to be significantly 
affected by future levels of the FEDFUNDS. 
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Figure 6.9: Cross correlation function between L(PNFI/GDP) and the FEDFUNDS. 
We would expect the effect of the FEDFUNDS on the investment rate to depend on the initial 
level of the FEDFUNDS, which seems to be confirmed by figure 6.10. It is a scatter plot of 
the FEDFUNDS and the log of the investment rate, L(PNFI/GDP) , including 10 sequential 
regression lines. However, as the initial level of the FEDFUNDS increases, the effect of it 
increasing becomes less significant, and in some cases even changes sign. In particular, for 
high levels of the FEDFUNDS, there seems to be a positive but rather small effect on the 
investment rate of changes in the FEDFUNDS. This suggests that the effect on the investment 
rate of increases in the FEDFUNDS is highly affected by the initial level of the FEDFUNDS, 
and this will set the premise for the inclusion of variables in the GUM presented next. 
 
Figure 6.10: Scatter plot of the FEDFUNDS and L(PNFI/GDP), with regression lines. 
For the econometric model, we specify a GUM with 8 lags of the dependent variable and all 
the explanatory variables, which are identical to those included in the GUM for housing 
prices. First a final model is tracked down, and thereafter tested for significant outliers, both 
at 5% significance level. The models then obtained, one for each trend, are reported in table 
6.3. Also in this case Autometrics has been instructed to keep the constant throughout the 
deletion process for the hp-trend, in order for the final model to have desirable long-run 
properties. 
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As already stated, the appearance of significant outliers in the final model indicates that there 
will be some effects on the investment rate that the changes in the FEDFUNDS are not able to 
explain. For instance, for the 4th
Table 6.3: Estimation results for the models selected by Autometrics, investment rate. 
 quarter of 1981 a significant outlier with a positive 
coefficient appears, regardless of the choice of trend. Knowing that the FEDFUNDS fell by 
about three percentage point (from a level of about 17%) compared to the preceding quarter, 
our model predicts that there should be a negligible increase in the investment rate, but the 
existence of the outlier suggests that it increases by more than what the change in the 
FEDFUNDS can account for. With reference to our theoretical model: the fall in the 
FEDFUNDS has made capital superior to financial assets, and everyone will start investing in 
real capital, its real rate of return will increase, and its marginal product decrease. A bubble 
will be created, which could be reflected by the positive outlier detected.  
Regressor Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Constant   -0.1381** -2.74  0.0079*  2.29
L(PNFI/GDP)hp(t-1) - -   0.9459***  36.1
L(PNFI/GDP)hp(t-5) - -  -0.1326*** -4.59
L(PNFI/GDP)(t-1)    1.0674***  44.2 - -
L(PNFI/GDP)(t-5)  -0.1171*** -5.04 - -
FEDFUNDS(t)   0.0040***   6.20   0.0038***  6.79
FEDFUNDS(t-3)  -0.0065***  -8.88  -0.0044*** -7.32
FEDFUNDS(t-8)   0.0025***   4.97 - -
INVFEDFUNDS(t) -0.0389*** -7.10  -0.0183***  -6.25
INVFEDFUNDS(t-1)  0.0197*** 6.65   0.0202***   6.35
INVFEDFUNDS(t-6) - -  -0.0173** -2.82
INVsqFEDFUNDS(t)  0.0024*** 3.79 - -
t3  2.13400e-009**  3.14 - -
I: 1968(2) -0.0471**  -3.34  -0.0473*** -3.54
I: 1980(2) - -  -0.0354** -2.63
I: 1980(3)  0.0407**   2.83 - -
I: 1981(4)  0.0551**   3.80  0.0513***  3.73
Diagnostic tests
AR 1-5 test
ARCH 1-4 test
Normality test
Hetero test
Hetero X-test
RESET 23 test
Other
No. of observations
R² 0.997164
0.0139539
F(14,198) =  0.88907
F(34,178) =   1.1987
F(2,203)  =   3.7210*
F(17,195) =  0.50996  
F(51,161) =   1.4921*
F(2,201)  = 0.084023
216[1956(3)-2010(3)]
0.897164
 0.013231
216[1956(3)-2010(2)]
Endogenous variable: L(PNFI/GDP)
F(5,200)  =  0.47282 
F(4,208)  =   1.1662 
Chi^ 2(2)  =   3.2875 
F(5,198)  =  0.62575 
F(4,208)  =  0.88286  
Chi^ 2(2)  =   3.5960  
Endogenous variable: L(PNFI/GDP)hp
σˆ  
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
The fact that some of the explanatory variables are included in the final model is definitely a 
sign of a relationship between interest rates and the investment rate. However, notice the low 
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absolute values of the coefficients, which indicate that the effect is rather small. Still, a 
conclusion can not be drawn before having a closer look at the dynamic multipliers. Once 
again the multipliers considered are for temporary changes in the FEDFUNDS, and are 
illustrated in figure 6.11 and figure 6.12, one for each trend. To obtain these multipliers, the 
same procedure as for housing prices is used.  
 
Figure 6.11: Temporary change in the FEDFUNDS, effect on L(PNFI/GDP), determ. trend.  
 
Figure 6.12:  Temporary change in the FEDFUNDS, effect on L(PNFI/GDP)hp, hp-trend.  
Note that in this case, as opposed to the case for housing prices, there seems to be larger 
compliance on the numerical size of dynamic multipliers across trends. Further, it seems as if 
the effects of a temporary change in the FEDFUNDS on the investment rate are rather 
modest, in this case even more so than for housing prices as the strongest effect appears to be 
some 0.3 percentage points, and that for a low initial FEDFUNDS level. Now, for a 
permanent marginal increase in the FEDFUNDS, the effects could differ substantially. In 
particular, for an initial level of the FEDFUND of 0.25 percentage points, a marginal 
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permanent increase will result in an increase of about 0.3 percentage points with the 
deterministic trend, but about 1.5 percentage points for the hp-trend. For larger initial levels 
of the FEDFUNDS, the effects are similar across trends. Thus, from our estimation results the 
following conclusion appears: The investment rate is modestly affected, and even less so able 
to control, by changes in the FEDFUNDS. 
Whenever the Fed adjusts its target for the federal funds rate in order to promote a high level 
of employment and low and stable inflation, our theoretical model predicts that the real rate of 
return to capital might be different from its marginal product, sending the economy into either 
a boom or bust. In particular, a reduction in the target for the federal funds rate may lead to a 
situation in which the marginal product of real capital is higher than its real rate of return. 
Such a situation will make real capital very attractive for producers, and thus their willingness 
to pay for it will increase substantially. Consequently, real capital will become an attractive 
asset to invest in, and the stock of real capital will increase, which will lead to a reduction in 
its marginal product. The occurrence of a bubble in the market for real capital appears 
evident: Its price is ever increasing regardless of the reduction in its marginal product. This 
short analysis suggests that when bubbles are first created, temporary changes in interest rates 
will hardly affect them, which seems to be confirmed by our estimation results, both for the 
investment rate and housing prices. 
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7 Conclusion 
Haavelmo’s model stands out from mainstream macroeconomic theories. The theory’s main 
implication, that the interest rate is not a “free” instruments variable for exchange rate or 
inflation targeting, unless one is prepared to forsake balance in asset markets, does not al  go 
down well with the mainstream view that holds the exact opposite. In particular, the model 
suggests that there is no certainty about the high correlation between investment activity and 
interest rates, and more so that it will depend on the conduct of monetary policy in a very 
complicated way, much more so than what is attempted described herein. However, despite 
our simple approach, we have found that it is possible to interpret recent events in light of 
Haavelmo’s framework. For example, it appears form our results that both housing prices and 
the investment rate are hard to control by means of moderate changes in interest rates, on U.S 
data.  
There is another interpretation of our finding off course: The empirical models may be said to 
be too loosely specified, and that their failure to capture a strong effect from interest rates to 
investments simply reflects that. Hence they cannot be interpreted as saying anything about 
whether Haavelmo had a valid point or not. I think that the verdict is still open and that more 
work needs to be done. What we have been reminded of though, is that economic stabilization 
through monetary policy needs a broad reference framework in which, in particular, the 
general (dis)equilibirum implications of interest rate setting need to be taken seriously.   
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Appendix A: Documentation of data 
The following gives definitions and names of the variables used in the econometric analysis 
and the graphs presented. Each entry starts with a heading, in boldface, with a descriptive 
name and a parenthesis with the name the variable has in the data file. Then follows a closer 
description of the variable (units of measurement and other information), and finally, sources 
are listed.    
Federal funds effective rate (FEDFUNDS) 
The percentage interest rate that the borrowing bank pays to the lending bank to borrow  
funds is negotiated between the two banks, and the weighted average of this rate across all 
such transactions is the federal funds effective rate. It is calculated by the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York using data provided by brokers. The source reports this variable at 
monthly rates, but for our purpose it has been transformed to quarterly rates. Since the 
FEDFUNDS is a stock variable, the quarterly rate appears as the average of the three relevant 
months. Not seasonally adjusted (NSA).  
Sources: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/FEDFUNDS , downloaded on 06.09.2010  
Gross domestic product (GDP) 
The gross domestic product is the market value of final goods and services produced within a 
nation’s (in our case the USA) borders during a fixed period of time. This variable is reported 
at quarterly rates in billions of chained 2005 dollars. Seasonally adjusted (SA). 
Source: Bureau of Economic analysis at http://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm#gdp under 
the heading Current-dollar and “real” GDP, downloaded on 23.09.2010.  
House price index (HPI) 
As defined by the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA): The HPI is a broad measure of 
the movement of single-family house prices. The HPI is a weighted, repeat-sales index, 
meaning that it measures average price changes in repeat sales or refinancings on the same 
properties. The national-level HPI considered in our case was created by finding the 
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arithmetic mean of those in the 50 U.S. States and the District of Columbia. The base year is 
1980, in which case the index is 100. The data are quarterly. NSA. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data for each state and the District of Columbia from 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/search?st=HPI&pageID=2 , downloaded on 07.09.2010.  
Private nonresidential fixed investment (PNFI) 
Private nonresidential fixed investment consists of purchases of both nonresidential structures 
and equipment and software. This variable is reported at quarterly rates in billions of chained 
2005 dollars. SA. 
Sources: Author’s calculations based on data for SA current-dollar PNFI and the SA “PNFI 
price index” (with 2005 as base year in which case the index is 100) from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of St. Louis FRED database, respectively at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/PNFI, downloaded on 07.09.2010, and 
http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=4&ViewSeries=NO&Ja
va=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Qtr&FirstYear=1947&LastY
ear=2010&3Place=N&Update=Update&JavaBox=no  (row 9 in the table), downloaded on 
23.09.2010 
A few words on the calculations. Let us first introduce the following variables: 
PNFI= the variable used in our analyses, reported in billions of chained 2005 dollars 
PNFIC= private fixed investment reported in current dollars 
PNFIPI=private fixed investment price index.  
The formula used is then, for each quarter q of each year y 
)2(2010),......,3(1947),2(1947),1(1947)(,
100
)(
)(
)( =
∗
= qy
PNFPI
PNFIC
PNFI
qy
qy
qy  
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CPI (consumer price index) 
As defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistic, the CPI is a measure of the average change over 
time in the prices paid by urban consumers for a market basket of consumer goods and 
services. The source reports this variable at monthly rates, but has been transformed to 
quarterly rates accounting for the fact that it is a stock variable. The average index level 
(representing the average price level) for the 36-month period covering the years 1982, 1983, 
and 1984  is set equal to 100. SA.  
The percentage CPI annual inflation rate is calculated by use of the following formula:  
=
−
= − )(,
100*)(
)(
)4()(
)( qyCPI
CPICPI
INF
qy
qyqy
qy 1947(1), 1947(2),……2010(2) 
where y denotes the year and q the quarter Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
database FRED at http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/CPIAUCSL, downloaded on 
10.11.2010.  
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Appendix B: Explanation of trends and 
diagnostic tests 
Most economic time series fluctuate around a time trend, and it is therefore convenient to 
decompose time series variables into a cyclical and a trend component. An exposition 
presented in Sørensen and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005) will prove useful in the following: 
If tY  is a time series variable (of which an example may be real GDP), it is convenient to 
think of it as the product of a growth component τtY , indicating the trend value which tY
would assume if the economy was always on its long-term growth path, and a cyclical 
component ctY which fluctuates around a long-run mean value of 1 (hence 
τ
tt YY = on 
average): 
(B.1)     cttt YYY ∗=
τ  
Recall that the change in the natural logarithm of some variable is approximately equal to the 
percentage change in the variable itself. Taking log on both sides of the above equation and 
defining the variables )ln(),ln( ττ tttt YYy == and )ln(
c
tt Yc = , we get: 
(B.2)     ttt cy += τ  
We will be able to observe the actual values of time series variables, but a completely 
objective method of separating the trend from the cyclical component does not exist. In our 
case this separation has been attempted performed by using four different trends, to which a 
brief introduction follows next.  
THE HODRICK PRESCOTT FILTER 
The Hodrick- Prescott filter has room for variations in the underlying trend component, but at 
the same time makes sure that short-term fluctuations are characterized as temporary cyclical 
deviations from trend. In particular, it suggests that the trend component, tτ  , be determined 
by solving the following problem:  
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where λ is chosen by the observer ( for US quarterly GDP - data it is customary to set λ  = 
1600). Recalling that ty  is measured in logarithms the term in the square bracket in the above 
stated minimization problem is the approximate growth rate of the trend component from 
period t to period t+1, while  the term tty τ−  is the cyclical component of the variable in 
period t. Then it becomes evident that the Hodrick Prescott filter introduces a tradeoff 
between minimizing fluctuations in the cyclical component and the trend component. The 
relative weight given to each objective will depend on the choice ofλ  , of which a higher 
value indicates a greater degree of aversion to fluctuations in the trend component. 
THE DETERMINISITC TRENDS  
All of these trends postulate that the trend component of any time series would grow at a 
constant rate. The trend component of the time series is found by regressing it on the relevant 
deterministic trend and storing the fitted values, as these will give us the level of the time 
series explained by fluctuations in the trend component. In particular, the linear trend 
component of the natural logarithm (following notation) of a time series, ty  , is found by the 
following procedure: 
1. Estimate the model: 
   tt uty ++= 10 βα  
2.  Store the fitted values, which will be our estimate of the trend component; tτˆ   
To find the square and the cubic trend component the models to be estimated are, respectively 
tt tty εββα +++=
2
210  
tt ttty εβββα ++++=
3
3
2
210  
Again, to find the estimated trend component, store the fitted values.  
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Next follows a simple verbal explanation of each of the diagnostic tests reported for each 
estimated model, based on those found in Doornik and Hendry (2009), Griffits, Hill and Lim 
(2008), and Bårdsen and Nymoen (forthcoming, 2011). 
ERROR AUTOCORRELATION TEST (AR-TEST) 
This test is based on an auxiliary regression of the estimated residuals from the original 
regression on their r –lags (in our case 5) and all the regressors in the initial model. The null 
of all of the coefficients of the lagged residuals being zero is tested against the alternative that 
either is different form zero, indicating that the residuals are auto correlated.  
AUTOREGRESSIVE CONDITIONAL HETEROSCEDASTICITY TEST (ARCH-
TEST) 
To perform this test it is necessary to first estimate the mean equation, which is a regression 
of the dependent variable on a constant. Then the estimated residuals tê are saved and their 
squares 2tê obtained. To test for r-order ARCH, 
2
tê  is regressed on r lags of the squared 
residuals and the null hypothesis of all of the coefficients being 0 is tested against the 
alternative that either is different from 0.  
NORMALITY TEST  
The null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals is tested against the alternative that they 
are not. Note that the test reported in this case is not the usual LM test by Jarque and Bera. 
For an explanation of the relevant test statistic, see Doornik and Hendry (2009), section 
18.4.4. 
HETEROSCEDASTICITY TEST USING ONLY SQUARES (HETERO TEST) 
An auxiliary regression of the squared of the residuals on the original regressors and all their 
squares is estimated. The null hypothesis of all these coefficients being 0, implying 
homoscedasticity, is tested against the alternative that at least one is different from zero, 
implying heteroskedasticity.  
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HETEROSCEDASTICITY TEST USING SQAURES AND CROSS PRODUCTS 
(HETERO-X TEST) 
This test is calculated only in cases where there is a large number of observations relative to 
the number of variables in the regression. It is based on an auxiliary regression of the squared 
residuals on all squares and cross products of all the regressors included in the original 
regression. The null hypothesis of all their coefficients being zero is tested against the 
alternative that either is different from 0, implying heteroscedasticity.  
REGRESSION SPECIFICATION TEST USING SQUARES AND CUBES (RESET23 
TEST)  
This test helps us detect omitted variables and incorrect functional forms. It is based on an 
auxiliary regression of the dependent variable on all the regressors included in the original 
regression in addition to the squared and cubed fitted values form that regression. We test the 
null of no misspecification, implying that both of the coefficients for the squared or cubic 
values are zero, against the alternative that at least one is different form zero.  
     
 
